The great reversal in the demand for skill and cognitive tasks by Beadry, Paul et al.
The great reversal in the demand for skill and
cognitive tasks
Paul Beaudry⇤
David A. Green†
Ben Sand‡
November 2013
Abstract
What explains the current low rate of employment in the US? While there
has been substantial debate over this question in recent years, we believe that
considerable added insight can be derived by focusing on changes in the labor
market at the turn of the century. In particular, we argue that in about the
year 2000, the demand for skill (or, more specifically, for cognitive tasks often
associated with high educational skill) underwent a reversal. Many researchers
have documented a strong, ongoing increase in the demand for skills in the
decades leading up to 2000. In this paper, we document a decline in that
demand in the years since 2000, even as the supply of high education workers
continues to grow. We go on to show that, in response to this demand reversal,
high-skilled workers have moved down the occupational ladder and have begun
to perform jobs traditionally performed by lower-skilled workers. This de-
skilling process, in turn, results in high-skilled workers pushing low-skilled
workers even further down the occupational ladder and, to some degree, out
of the labor force all together. In order to understand these patterns, we o↵er
a simple extension to the standard skill biased technical change model that
views cognitive tasks as a stock rather than a flow. We show how such a
model can explain the reversal in the data that we present, and o↵ers a novel
interpretation of the current employment situation in the US.
⇤University of British Columbia, and NBER
†University of British Columbia and Research Fellow, IFS, London
‡York University.
Introduction
The poor performance of the US labor market since the financial crisis of 2008 contin-
ues to generate enormous debate fuelled by ongoing disagreement about the funda-
mental forces driving the decline. One side argues that di culties in the US economy
can be characterized as stemming from very weak aggregate demand due to a de-
leveraging process and the zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates.
The other side argues for a set of explanations which emphasize more structural dif-
ficulties in combination with cyclical elements. Many of these structural explanations
view the housing boom of the 2000s as having hidden (for a few years) longer term
problems with employment options. The housing bust accompanying the cyclical
downturn is then viewed as unveiling those problems. For example, the papers by
Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2012) and Siu and Jaimovich (2012) emphasize
the ongoing role of declining manufacturing employment and the disappearance of
other routine jobs in causing the current low rates of employment. This type of
explanation traces the origins of current di culties back several decades, with a pos-
sible acceleration of the process more recently. While these di↵erent perspectives
contain important elements for understanding the current situation, we believe that
an important factor has been missed in the current debate.
In this paper, we argue that in about the year 2000, the demand for skill (or, more
specifically, the demand for cognitive tasks that are often associated with high edu-
cational skill) underwent a reversal, and that this reversal can help in understanding
poor labor market outcomes after 2000 more generally.1 Numerous researchers have
documented a substantial growth in the demand for occupations involving cognitive
tasks (whether occurring exogenously (Katz and Murphy, 1992) or endogenously
(Beaudry and Green, 2005; Acemoglu, 2002)) and an accompanying reduction in the
demand for more middle-wage routine occupations in the two decades or so before
2000 (Juhn (1999); Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003); Autor and Dorn (2013); Au-
tor, Katz, and Kearney (2006, 2008); Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Scho¨nberg (2009);
Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011); Goos and Manning (2007)). This period is often
described as a period of polarization, with an increased concentration of employment
in either high-paying cognitive occupations or in lower-paying manual-service jobs.
Since more educated workers have a comparative advantage in performing cognitive
1Throughout this paper, we will focus on three broad occupation groups that are based on the
discussion in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Cognitive task occupations consist mainly of managers,
professionals and technical workers, and are seen as complementary to Information Technology
capital and the organizational forms that go with it. Routine tasks are mainly production and
clerical workers, and are seen as easily replaced by the new technology. Manual tasks are laborer
and service occupations which require low skill but are not easily substituted for with IT capital.
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tasks, this explains a large fraction of the increase in returns to education over the
period. While the existing literature appears to reflect an implicit belief that this
process has continued unabated in the period since the turn of the century, the first
object of this paper will be to document that the demand for cognitive tasks has
actually been declining since 2000. While such a decline in demand has had, and
continues to have, a direct impact on more skilled workers, we go on to show that it
has likely had a substantial impact on less skilled workers as well. In particular, we
argue that in response to the demand reversal, high-skilled workers have moved down
the occupational ladder and have begun to perform jobs traditionally performed by
lower-skilled workers. This de-skilling process, in turn, resulted in high-skilled work-
ers pushing low-skilled workers even further down the occupational ladder and, to
some degree, out of the labor force all together. This process had been going on
since 2000, but, as argued in earlier papers, the housing boom between 2003 and
2006 masked some of the e↵ects which only become fully apparent after the financial
crisis.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we present a simple framework
clarifying why skilled-biased technological change can cause a boom and bust in the
demand for cognitive tasks. The key idea is that the IT revolution, and the revolution
in organizational form that has gone with it, can be seen as a General Purpose
Technology (GPT) and, like all GPTs before it, it will eventually reach maturity. If
the implementation of the GPT has a capital investment form and cognitive tasks
are a key component of the investment phase, under reasonable conditions, demand
for cognitive tasks will have an over-shooting property. During the key investment
stage, there will be high and growing demand for cognitive tasks to build the new
capital, but once the new capital is in place, cognitive task workers are only needed
to maintain the new capital. At this maturity stage, there will be greater demand for
cognitive tasks than before the technological revolution but we will see a reduction
in demand for these tasks relative to the peak investment stage. We argue that the
turn of the century is that approximate turning point from the peak investment to
the maturity stage. Importantly, it is not the case that all innovation related to the
GPT needs to cease in the maturity stage for this model to fit the data patterns
we describe; only that it slow down. As an historical example, innovation related to
electricity continued long after the investments involved in building the spine of the
national electrical system were completed.
In describing the adjustment process for this cycle, we exploit insights of the
extensive task-versus-skill literature (see Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for an overview)
which emphasizes that changes in task demands will a↵ect workers across the entire
labor market – not just those currently performing these tasks – since workers will
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adapt to changing circumstances by redirecting the supply of their skills to the other
tasks they can perform. In particular, we are arguing that relative to the 1990s,
the post 2000 maturity era for the IT revolution is one where even the demand for
skilled workers is reduced. In this maturity stage, having a college degree is only
partly about obtaining access to high-paying managerial and technology jobs since it
is also about beating out less educated workers for barista and clerical job type jobs.
Our second main contribution is that we provide a detailed picture of the changes
in employment patterns and wages over the last thirty years with a particular focus
on the reversal in the growth in demand for more cognitive intensive occupations
and the adjustment of more skilled workers to this change. Importantly, we view
this contribution as standing even if the reader is not convinced about our specific
story behind the cognitive task demand reversal.
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. In section 1 we
begin by presenting some very broad labor market trends which highlight the salience
of the year 2000 as an important turning point in the US economy. Since 2000 is the
year of the Tech Bust, this motivates some of our modelling choices in Section 2. In
that section, we present a simple dynamic model of adjustment to new technological
opportunities which creates a cycle in the demand for cognitive tasks together with
a continuous decline in the demand for routine tasks. During this process, workers
with di↵erent skills shift their supply of labor across tasks as a means of adapting
to the changes in demand. Since the model is highly stylized, at the end of the
section we provide an heuristic generalization which provides an general framework
for exploring the empirical relevance of our story. Section 3 looks at a large set of
data patterns. In particular, we examine the employment patterns in di↵erent sets of
occupations, the assignment of workers of di↵erent skills to tasks, and adjustment in
wages. A key challenge in our empirical investigations will be to try to focus on skill
price changes by netting out changes in the composition of the labor force arising, for
example, from increased educational attainment in the population as a whole. We
focus much of our attention on wage adjustments of younger workers as we believe
these best reflect current changes in market forces.
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1 Aggregate Employment and Average Real Wages
1.1 Data
We begin our investigation by presenting some key labor market trends for the US.
The data we use for this (and the empirical exercises later in the paper) are drawn
from the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) Current Population Survey Supplements
for the years 1979-2011. Following Lemieux (2006), we use the hourly wage as our
wage measure, weight observations by hours worked in combination with the ORG
weights, and do not use observations with allocated wages.2 Wages, hours of work
and employment status refer to the week prior to the survey week. We present annual
values by averaging across all months in a calendar year. For our employment rate
constructs, we sum the number of respondents who report working in the reference
week over the calendar year and divide this by the sum of working age respondents
in the calender year. In doing so, we adjust the ORG weights such that the annual
sum equals the size of the US population for a particular group. In all our empirical
work, we restrict the sample to individuals aged 18-64 with positive potential work
experience.
1.2 Wage and Employment Rate Patterns
In Figure 1 we plot the employment rate of individuals 18-64. We superimpose on
the figure an estimated linear trend allowing for one break. The pattern in the figure
is quite clear and rather well known. The US employment rate increases relatively
continuously over the 1980s and 1990s, and then this growth reverses around 2000
(testing for the single optimal break point actually indicates 1999 as the point of the
break with these data). The growth in the employment rate in the 1980s and part of
the 1990s is dominated by the trend increase in participation of women in the labor
force. It is striking to note that the reversal after 2000 was so strong that by 2010 the
employment rate was back to a level close to what was recorded in 1980. In Figure
2 we plot the average real hourly wage for all workers against the employment rate.
We focus on the post 1990 period to focus attention away (to some extent) from the
role of the increased labor attachment of women. Figures 3 and 4 contain the same
wage-employment diagram for men and women separately. All three figures paint
2Toward the end of the paper, when we examine percentiles of the wage distribution we use both
allocated and non-allocated wages. The Data appendix provides additional information on our data
processing.
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a similar picture: from 1990 to around 2000, both employment rates and average
real wages rose. Then after 2000, employment rates started to decline while average
wages did not. Moreover, in each of these figures, the 2003-2007 period appears as
what might be characterized as a stalling phase in a more general process.
One might suspect that the increase in average wages observed after 2000 in Fig-
ure 2 simply reflects a shift in the composition of employment toward more highly
educated workers. However, as we show in the appendix, when we plot the ana-
logue of that figure for high school and college educated workers separately, we see
a very similar pattern for each group. So, if the behavior of average wages after
2000 is driven by some sort of selection process, it is most likely within-education
groups. Nonetheless, there is one important cross-education group distinction which
we highlight in Figure 5. In this figure, we plot the ratio of the employment rate of
high school educated workers to that of college educated workers. From this we see
that, prior to 2000, the employment ratio of the high school workers is increasing
faster than that of the college workers, while after 2000 we have the reverse. Thus,
changes in the employment rate of less educated workers play an important role in
the employment rate patterns observed in Figure 2.
The patterns in these first five figures motivate us to downplay the housing boom
and bust of 2003-2008 for understanding the current labor market situation and
instead incites us to focus on more long-run trends. In particular, we want to ask:
“What type of force could be driving such a medium run process where employment
and wages increase for at least a decade follwed by a reversal?” Since 2000 was the
year of the bust in the high-tech sector, it seems reasonable to us to begin by exploring
this issue with a model which emphasizes technological change as presented in the
following section. In the choice of modelling strategy, we are aiming at a unified
explanation of both the pre-2000 and post-2000 period in order to o↵er, among
others, a qualitative and unified explanation to the inverse ‘C’ relationship between
employment rates and average wages presented in Figure 2. The model we present
will have a set of implications for employment, wage behavior and occupational
choice; and we will show how the data support these implications.3
To further motivate our focus on explaining current labor market patterns as
reflecting a medium run boom and bust driven by the IT revolution, in Figures 6
3 We should note from the outset that the model we present is not the only one capable of
rationalizing the data patterns we emphasize. We see several alternative avenues for explaining
the patterns presented in this paper. For example, we could adopt an approach with two di↵erent
driving forces, one that explains the pre-2000 period and one that explains the post-2000 period,
and the data we present may not be able to di↵erentiate the two views. Nonetheless, we think the
model is very useful in helping organize an approach to the data.
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to 9 we report a set of changes in the share of investment in information technology
over the last few decades. Figure 6 reports the share of GDP directed to investment
in equipment and software. As can be seen, this share rose by close to 40% from the
mid-70s to 2000, with most of that rise occurring in the 1990s. However, since 2000
this share has been on a downward trajectory, bring us back to levels of the mid-
seventies. Figures 7, 8 and 9 echo the same message using more restrictive measures
of investment in IT. Figure 6 plots investment in information processing equipment
and software as a ratio to GDP, while Figure 8 focuses only on investment in computer
hardware. In both these figures we see a more than 50% rise in the investment share
over the 80s and 90s, followed by a drastic and sustained fall post 2000. Figure 9
reports the investment share in software. Here the pattern is less dramatic. Software
investment also experienced a huge increase in the 80s and 90s, but since 2000 there
has essentially seen a stagnation for this series instead of a fall. All these figures
support the notion that there appears to have been an important change around the
year 2000. Our main claim is that the same force driving the investment patterns
can help in understanding labor market patterns.
2 A model of boom and bust in the demand for
cognitive tasks
The goal of this section is to show how a rather standard model of skill-biased
technological change, extended to include a dynamic adjustment process, can create
a boom-bust cycle in the demand for cognitive tasks along with a continuous decline
in the demand for routine tasks. Our aim will be to emphasize simple empirical
implications of the model, which can then be readily compared with data.
2.1 Basic Model
Consider an environment with three types of agents: highly educated individuals,
less educated individuals, and entrepreneurs who run firms. There is one consump-
tion good which plays the role of the numeraire. All individuals are risk neutral
and discount the future at rate, ⇢. The entrepreneurs hire individuals to perform
two distinct tasks. One task will be referred to as a cognitive task (or cognitive
occupation) and one as a routine task. Individuals can perform only one task at a
time, choosing where to supply their labor based on comparative advantage. The
market for each task is assumed to be competitive and to function in a Walrasian
fashion. The production possibilities available to the entrepreneur will vary over
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time to reflect technological change in favor of the more cognitive task. Our main
departure from the literature on skill-biased technological change will be the way we
assume the cognitive task a↵ects production. In particular, instead of assuming that
these tasks only a↵ect current production, we view these tasks as building intangible
capital for the firm in the form of organizational capital denoted by ⌦t. We refer to
this as organizational capital in order to emphasize recent changes that go beyond
the direct use of computers in production. We will show that this simple alteration
leads to a model with a boom and bust in demand for the cognitive task.
Defining Lct as the e↵ective units of the cognitive task hired by the representative
firm and Lrt as the e↵ective units of the routine task, we can represent the optimiza-
tion problem faced by the entrepreneur as choosing Lct and L
r
t to maximize profits
given by,
max
{Lct},{Lrt }
Z 1
0
[F (⌦t, L
r
t , N, ✓t)  wctLct   wrtLrt ]exp⇢tdt
s.t
⌦˙ = Lct    ⌦, (1)
where F (·) is the instantaneous production function of the consumption good, N is
the entrepreneur’s time endowment, ✓t is an technology parameter,   is the depreci-
ation rate of organizational capital, wct is the price of an e↵ective unit of cognitive
skill and wrt is the price of an e↵ective unit of routine skill. The production function
is assumed to be increasing in all its arguments, concave, and to exhibit constant re-
turns to scale with respect to Lc, Lr, and N . For simplicity, we will normalize N = 1
and drop it from further notation. The law of motion for organizational capital, ⌦,
which says that it is created with cognitive tasks and depreciates at a constant rate,
will play a key role in the insights gained from the model.
We make two main assumptions regarding the production function. The first
(which is standard in the large literature on skill-biased technical change and polar-
ization) is that the organizational capital produced by cognitive tasks is a substitute
for routine labor, that is, F⌦,Lr < 0. Second, we assume that an increase in ✓ in-
creases the productivity of the organizational capital produced by the cognitive task,
that is, F⌦,✓ > 0. For simplicity, we also assume that ✓ has no direct e↵ect on the
productivity of routine tasks, that is, FLr,✓ = 0.4 Many examples of this type of tech-
nology (including the use of computers in clerical workplaces) have been presented
in discussions of technological change and polarization.
4We could relax this last assumption and allow for a more general production technology. What
we need is that the main e↵ect of technological change is to raise the productivity of ⌦.
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The first order conditions associated with this optimization are given by:
FLr(⌦t, L
r
t , N, ✓t) = w
r
t (2)
w˙ct = (  + ⇢)w
c
t   F⌦(⌦t, Lrt , N, ✓t). (3)
The first condition indicates that units of the routine task should be hired up
until their marginal product is equal to their task price, while the second condition
indicates that organizational capital should be accumulated to the point where its
marginal product is equal to its user cost inclusive of capital gains of losses on the
value of ⌦ (note that the shadow price of ⌦ is simply wct ). The two conditions, (2)
and (3), combined with the accumulation equation, Q˙ = Lct    Q, implicitly define
the demands for cognitive and routine tasks as functions of their prices.
To complete the model we need to determine how the supplies of cognitive and
routine tasks respond to prices. This requires specifying the labor supply decisions
of the the high- and low-educated workers. The problem faced by these individuals
will be virtually identical except for the fact that the distribution of their relative
productivities in the two tasks will di↵er. Let us begin by considering the decision
problem faced by a high-education worker.
Assume there is a measure H of highly educated workers and each of these indi-
viduals has an identifier  drawn from a uniform distribution defined over the unit
interval [0, 1]. The identifier  gives their productivity rank in cognitive tasks with
a function, h( ), translating that rank into e↵ective units of cognitive skill. For
convenience, we will define h( ) such that h0( )  0, i.e.,  ranks individuals in
decreasing order of productivity. Accordingly, if a high educated individual indexed
by  decides to supply her labor to the cognitive occupation, she will receive a wage,
h( )wct . In contrast, we will assume that her productivity in routine tasks is inde-
pendent of  and is such that she would supply 1 + ↵ e↵ective units of the routine
task, (where ↵ > 0). This implies that her wage payment if she supplied her labor
to the routine task would be (1+↵) ·wrt . The individual also has the option of home
production, where her labor can produce A units of the consumption good. As will
become clear, in equilibrium wrt will be greater or equal to A so that highly educated
workers will not choose to stay in the home sector. Thus, their optimal decision will
be characterized by a cut-o↵ for  denoted  ¯t and defined by:
wct · h( ¯t) = (1 + ↵) · wrt , (4)
with individuals having a    ¯t supplying their labor to cognitive tasks and those
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with  >  ¯t supplying their labor to the market for routine work.5
The decision problem for less educated workers is very similar. There is a measure
W of the less educated workers, and each of these has an index   drawn from a
uniform distribution on [0, 1], with g( ) giving the e↵ective units of cognitive skill of
a less educated worker with rank  . The first di↵erence between the more and less
educated workers is that h(x) > g(x) for all x 2 [0, 1]; that is, less educated workers
of each rank generate fewer e↵ective units of cognitive tasks. For simplicity, we will
assume that these e↵ective unit functions have the same shape, with g(x) = b · h(x)
and 0  b < 1. If a less educated worker supplies his labor to routine tasks, he
will receive a wage payment wrt since we assume that his labor is equivalent to 1
e↵ective unit of routine work independent of his rank,  . The fact that the e↵ective
labor of less educated workers is also lower in routine tasks is the second di↵erence
that separates the two classes of workers.6 As with the more educated workers, less
educated workers produce A units of the consumption good if they choose home
production.
The decision problem of the less educated workers is characterized by a cut-o↵
 ¯t, implicitly defined by:
wct · b · h( ¯t) = wrt , (5)
where all workers with     ¯t supply their labor to cognitive tasks. For workers
with   >  ¯t there are two possible equilibrium configurations. Either wrt > A and
they supply their labor to routine tasks, or wrt = A and they are indi↵erent between
working at routine tasks or staying at home. In the latter case, the division of
labor between routine jobs and home work will be determined solely by demand. In
particular, if wrt = A, the employment of routine tasks is implicitly determined by
FLr(⌦t, Lrt , N, ✓t) = A. We will assume that routine employment for less educated
workers is this demand minus the amount of the routine task supplied by more
educated workers.7 As a result, the fraction of less educated workers in routine jobs
at a point in time will be given by:
Lrt  H(1   ¯)(1 + ↵)
W
.
Using the decision rules for both classes of workers, the total supply of e↵ective
5If  ¯t   1, then all high-education workers supply their labor to cognitive occupations.
6This could occur, for example, even if more educated workers are not more productive per unit
time working at a routine task but are more likely to show up to work on time each day.
7In order to guarantee that more educated worker have a comparative advantage in cognitive
jobs, we assume that b · (1 + ↵) < 1.
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Table 1: Summary of Key Model Constructs
Cognitive Emp. Cognitive Wage Routine Emp. Routine Wage
High Education H ·  ¯t wct
R  ¯t
0
h( )
 ¯t
d H(1   ¯t) (1 + ↵)A
Low Education W ·  ¯t wct
R  ¯t
0
h( )
 ¯t
d  Lrt  H(1 + ↵)(1   ¯t) A
Emp. Rate H· ¯t+W · ¯tH+W
Lrt ↵H
H+W
units of cognitive task labor can be expressed as:
Lct = H
Z  ¯
0
h( )d +W
Z  ¯
0
g( )d , (6)
where the upper limits of integration are determined by the equations (4) and (5).8
As we want to focus on a case where technological adjustment can change the
economy’s employment rate, we will assume that parameter values are such that
equilibrium is characterized by wrt = A and the employment rate becomes demand
determined. In this case, the equilibrium determination of Lct , L
r
t ,⌦t, w
c
t ,  ¯t,  ¯t is
given by the solution to the system of equations (1) through (6). Once we know
these quantities, we can easily derive – among others – the number of workers in
each occupational-education cell and the average wage for each of these cells, as well
as the employment rate for di↵erent occupations or di↵erent education groups. Table
1 provides explicit expressions for some key employment and wage entities.
2.2 Steady State Implications
We now turn to the question of how such an economy reacts to an increase in ✓. In
particular, we want to highlight the dynamic properties of this model when, starting
from a steady state with constant ✓, there is an improvement of ✓ over time which
takes the shape of a di↵usion process. However, before looking at the dynamic
properties, we want to highlight the di↵erence between an initial steady state with
✓ = ✓0 and a later steady state with ✓ = ✓1 > ✓0. In doing this, we want to emphasize
that when looking only at steady state comparisons, the model maintains the key
features emphasized in the skill biased technological change literature. This is stated
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The steady state e↵ects of an increase in ✓ are:
8To be more precise, the upper limits of integration should be of the form max[1,  ¯] and max[1,  ¯].
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– An increase in the employment rate in cognitive occupations and a decrease in
the employment rate in routine occupations.
– Skill upgrading in the sense that, for each education class, a greater fraction of
individuals is in cognitive occupations.
– The wage di↵erential between more and less educated workers will increase as
long as b is not too big.9
Proposition 1 indicates that when comparing steady states, our model mimics
implications of existing models of skill biased technological change with endogenous
occupational choice (See, for example, Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). However, the
addition of organizational capital to the standard model does permit some extra
steady state implications, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1B If   is su ciently small, the steady state e↵ects of an increase in
✓ are:
– The overall average wage increases,
– The overall employment rate decreases.
The intuition behind this proposition is that when   is small, the fruits of cognitive
employment act like a capital stock. With more organizational capital being used
in the higher ✓ steady state, more cognitive tasks are needed to o↵set depreciation.
This, in turn, implies more workers in the high wage, cognitive occupation and, thus,
a higher overall average wage. However, with more organizational capital in the new
regime, there is also lower demand for routine tasks and if the number of added
workers needed to service the new organizational capital is not too large (i.e., if   is
small) then the net e↵ect is a reduction in demand for labor overall, and a reduction
in the employment rate. This fits with the long run pattern shown in our first set of
figures, with a decrease in the employment rate and an increase in the average wage
between the early 1990s and the late 2000s. While at first pass, such a pattern may
seem to require a inward shift of a labor supply curve, our model suggests it could
be the result of technological change. To explore the relevance of such a possibility,
we now examine the model’s dynamic implications.
9 In this model it is possible for an increase in ✓ to reduce the di↵erential between more and
less educated workers. This arises when the technological change pushes a su ciently large number
of the lowest paid less educated individuals out of market employment, leaving mainly the lower
educated workers employed in relatively high paying cognitive jobs. However, this will not arise if
b is su ciently small.
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2.3 Dynamics
The new insights of our model come from its dynamic implications for an economy
adjusting to the di↵usion of technological knowledge. For simplicity, we take an
extreme form of a di↵usion process whereby at time 0 the economy is in a steady
state with ✓ = ✓0, and then all the agents in the economy learn that ✓ will increase
to ✓1 > ✓0 at time ⌧ . Thus, the di↵usion process used here is a step function, which
allows for an easy characterization of the problem. The results extend easily to a
more gradual process, including one where di↵usion is first rapid then slows down as
the technology gradually reaches maturity.
To analyze this dynamic system, we can either examine the issue numerically,
take a linear approximation of the system, or adopt simple functional forms. We
choose to follow the latter route as it allows for an analytical solution and simplifies
the exposition. Thus, we will assume that the production function takes the following
quadratic form: F (⌦t, Lrt , ✓t) =  1✓t⌦t +  2L
r
t    3⌦tLrt    4⌦2t    5(Lrt )2, with the
concavity restrictions (4 4 5 >  23). For the functions determining the supply of
e↵ective units of cognitive labor, we assume that h( ) =   
1
2 and g( ) = b  
1
2 , with
0  b < 1. Under this parametrization, our dynamic system can be reduced to a two
dimension linear system in Lct and ⌦t as given by (1) and:
L˙c = (  + ⇢)LCt +
4 4 5    23
2 5
⌦t    1
⌘
✓t + , (7)
where ⌘ = 2(H+W (1+↵)b
2)
(1+↵)A and  =
 3( 2 A)
2 5
.10 Given a solution for this system, the
values of Lrt , w
c
t ,  ¯t and  ¯t are then given by:
Lrt =
 2    3⌦t   A
2 5
,
W ct =
1
⌘
Lct ,
 ¯t =
✓
wct
(1 + ↵)A
◆2
,
 ¯t =
✓
bwct
(1 + ↵)A
◆2
.
The dynamics of this two variable system can be represented by a phase diagram
as given in Figure 10. In this figure we see that there is an initial stage where the
10The two boundary conditions for this system are an initial value for ⌦t and the transversality
condition associated with the entrepreneurs’ optimization problem. Throughout, we assume that
 2 >  3⌦t +A so as to have positive employment in routine jobs.
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employment of cognitive skills increase followed by a period of decrease. Throughout
this process, ⌦t increases and the employment of routine skills decrease. The turning
point for cognitive skill employment is at time t = ⌧ where the technology becomes
fully operational.11 We present the implications for the economy in two propositions,
with Proposition 2 containing the implications during the period when cognitive task
employment is increasing and Proposition 3 corresponding to the period when it is
decreasing.12
Proposition 2. Upon learning of the di↵usion process for technology, the economy
will initially go through a stage where:
– The average employment rate and, by implication, the employment rate of less
educated workers, will increase.
– The average wage will increase, as will the average wage of each educational
class.
– There will be skill upgrading in the sense that the fraction of employment in
cognitive jobs of both education groups will increase.
Proposition 2 indicates that the arrival of the new technological opportunities will
lead to an initial period where the economy can be unambiguously described as a
going through a boom. In particular, the economy will initially experience increased
employment and wages, and this is beneficial to both types of workers. Intuitively,
during the boom period there is increasing demand for cognitive tasks in order to
build the organizational capital that will allow the economy to take full advantage of
the technological change. This will generate increases in the cognitive task price, wct ,
which will draw both high- and low-education workers into cognitive occupations.
This, in turn, puts pressure on the routine task market that draws more individuals
out of the home production sector, raising the employment rate.
However, as the next proposition indicates, this boom will eventually by followed
by a bust period. It is this subsequent bust period induced by the process of tech-
nology adoption which is the key insight of the model.13
11Note that these dynamics mimic those associated with a standard Q-theory of investment with
an anticipated shock.
12Here we do not need to assume that b and ↵ are small.
13There are several models in the literature which suggest that skill biased technological change
can create an initial bust period (e.g., Carlaw and Lipsey (2002)), but seldom do they predict a
later bust period.
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Proposition 3. Due to the di↵usion of the new technology, the economy will even-
tually go into a bust phase (which will last until the new steady state is attained)
with the following properties (expressed relative to the boom period):
– A decrease in the aggregate employment rate including a decrease in the em-
ployment rate of both cognitive and routine occupations.
– Skill degrading in the sense that, for each education class, a lower fraction of
individuals is employed in cognitive occupations.
– For less educated workers, there is also a reduction in the fraction of individuals
in routine tasks and an increase in non-employment.
– Except during a bust, there are continued increases in returns for the en-
trepreneurial class.
Although technological change in the model has only positive impacts on the
productivity of cognitive tasks, Proposition 3 states that this change eventually leads
to a period characterized by a decreasing path for the cognitive task employment rate.
This arises because cognitive tasks are modelled as creating a stock of organizational
capital for the firm. Hence, there is an initial period when firms want to hire cognitive
task workers to increase the stock of this capital, but eventually, when the stock is
su ciently large, there is less need for cognitive employment as it is only required
to o↵set depreciation. If   happens to be very close to zero, then the change in
employment in cognitive tasks induced by a change in ✓ would be essentially an
entirely temporary phenomena. Once the economy enters into the period of declining
cognitive task employment, it is clearly in a bust period as it is also the case that
employment in routine tasks continue to be replaced by the improved organizational
capital.
It is interesting to highlight the skill downgrading process and its crowding out
e↵ect of the employment of low-educated workers during the bust period. The re-
duction in demand for cognitive jobs during this period implies that high-educated
workers switch, in part, to accepting routine jobs. This movement of high-educated
workers into the less skilled occupations amplifies the push of less educated workers
toward non-employment. In fact, less educated workers move out of cognitive jobs
because of the decrease in demand for those tasks, and they move out of routine jobs
both because of decreased demand and because of increased supply to those jobs by
the higher educated individuals. In this sense, employment has what we think of as
a cascading nature, with more skilled workers flowing down the occupation structure
and pushing less skilled workers even further down. Hence, even though the major
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change in the bust period relative to the boom period is the shift in the demand
for cognitive jobs, non-employment increases among the less-educated as this is the
main escape valve for the labor market.
Because of some of the stark assumptions we use in the model, its implications
for wages are more stylized than those for quantities. In particular, it can easily be
verified that the average wage for each education-occupation grouping is actually a
constant in this model.14 For the routine occupations this is not surprising since
wages are pinned down by the value of home production, which is a constant by
assumption. For the cognitive occupation this may be somewhat more surprising
since the price of e↵ective units of cognitive skill goes though an identical boom-bust
cycle to that of employment in cognitive occupations. However, selection acts to de-
couple movements in the skill price from movements in the observed average wage in
cognitive occupations. When the price of e↵ective units goes up, the marginally less
productive individuals enter these occupations, bringing down the average observed
wage. Given the functional forms assumed for task-generation functions, these two
e↵ects cancel each other out, leaving average wages within occupation-education
classes constant. Thus, the model’s insights for occupational average wages is limited,
and one needs to focus either on trying to obtain estimates of skill price movements
by controlling for selection or on average wages for skill groups. For groups defined
by skill, selection is assumed not to be an issue and thus wage implications can be
examined directly.
With these selection forces in mind, it is interesting to consider how the average
wage for the whole economy behaves during the bust period.15 On the one hand,
during this period there is a movement away from the high-paying cognitive jobs to
the low-paying routine jobs, and this should depress the average wage. However, at
the same time, less educated workers are leaving the labor force to non-employment,
and since the departing individuals had the lowest wages, this tends to increase the
overall average wage. Hence, the bust in this model – although it is spread widely
across the economy – can be consistent with an average wage that looks rather
unresponsive to the decline in employment.
To illustrate this latter fact, Figure 11 plots the joint movement of the average
wage and the employment rate for a simple parametrization of the model.16 As can
14For example, the average wage for high educated workers in the cognitive occupation is 2A(1+
↵), while for the lower educated individuals in the same occupation it is simply 2A.
15Proposition 1 already indicated that it will initially increase during the boom period.
16Figure is generated from a discrete-time version of the model. The production function is
given by F (⌦, Lr, ✓) = ↵1Q + ↵2Lr   ↵3QLr   ↵4Q2   ↵5 (Lr)2 + ↵6✓Q, with parametrization
(↵1,↵2,↵3,↵4,↵5,↵6) = (2, 4.3, 1.1, 0.4, 1.2, 1). The firm’s discount factor is   = 0.95, and the
depreciation rate on organizational capital is   = 0.1. A highly educated individual of rank  2 [0, 1]
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be seen in the figure, the employment rate and the average wage initially increase and
then there is a reversal with the employment decreasing but the average wage actually
increasing slightly. While this figure should be taken only as illustrative since the
parameters are chosen arbitrarily, it does convey that this model can qualitatively
replicate the pattern reported in Figure 2. More specifically, when Propositions 2
and 3 are combined with Proposition 1B we see that the model o↵ers an explanation
for the patterns described in Figures 2-4. Recall that in the 1990s, these figures
depict an economy with an increasing average wage and rising employment rates -
exactly what is predicted for the economy in Proposition 2 if we see the 1990s as
part of the boom period. In contrast, the post-2000 period fits with the Proposition
3 prediction of declining employment rates and with the claim that selection implies
muted movements in the overall average wage. Proposition 1B states that if   is
su ciently small then the process will converge to a point where the employment
rate is lower and the average wage higher than the point of departure, which fits
with the long term di↵erences in these figures. Thus, the model provides a unified
explanation for the wage and employment patterns in the 1990s and 2000s with only
one driving force. In contrast, an explanation built from a simple demand and supply
model would require both positive movements in demand in the 1990s and negative
supply shifts in the 2000s. Our model avoids the need to invoke unexplained labor
supply disturbances to understand the patterns.
2.4 Main Implications and Manual Tasks
The model presented to this point is useful in terms of providing a way to organize
our thoughts about empirical patterns (e.g., highlighting di culties in interpreting
average occupational wages) but it is also highly stylized. In this subsection, we
recast the key elements and outcomes of the model in a simple demand and supply
framework. Our goal is to try to emphasize the key lessons and direct attention away
from simplifying assumptions that were made for reasons of tractability and logical
completeness.
One key way in which the model is stylized is in its use of only three sectors
working in the cognitive sector supplies h ( ) = a  1/2 e ciency units of labor, while a less-
educated individual of rank   2 [0, 1] supplies g ( ) = b  1/2 e ciency units of labor, where we
set a = 0.15 and b = 0.1. In the routine sector, highly educated and less-educated workers supply
1 + ↵ and 1 e↵ective units of labor, respectively, where ↵ = 0.05. All workers produce A = 1 units
of output per unit of labor in the home sector. There are total measures µH = 0.7 and µL = 1
of highly educated and less-educated workers, respectively. The Figure plots the response of the
economy to shocks to ✓ as follows: at t = 0, the economy is in steady state with ✓0 = 0.2. At t = 1,
agents learn that at t = 10, ✓ will increase to ✓1 = 0.3 and remain at that level thereafter.
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(cognitive, routine, and home). This omits the non-routine manual sector which has
been the focus of a substantial portion of the literature on polarization. We made
this choice because we do not have anything to add to what the existing literature
has found for these jobs in the 1990s and including it in the model would not have
changed the conclusions about the cognitive and routine sectors but would have made
the model too cumbersome to provide clean insights into what we see as a new point:
the demand reversal for cognitive tasks. In the more heuristic description in this
section, however, we will add the manual task sector.
Figure 12a provides a depiction of what we see as the dominant event in the
cognitive task market in the boom period (the 1990s): a shift out in demand.17
In our model, this happens because firms are building organizational capital to take
advantage of the technical change but it could also arise from a more standard model
with cognitive tasks entering the production function directly and a technical change
biased in favor of these tasks. Figure 12b shows the market for routine tasks in
the 1990s. Here we see both a shift down in demand (since the technical change
is biased against such tasks) and a shift back in supply as workers are drawn up
into the cognitive task market. Again, both of these would be found in standard
polarization models, though the supply shift tends not to be emphasized. Taken
together, we expect to see a rise in employment and the skill price for cognitive tasks
and a decline in employment and possibly the skill price for routine tasks.18
In Figure 13a, we represent the market for manual tasks in the boom period.
We follow Autor and Dorn (2013) in viewing manual tasks as directly providing a
service good to households. In the boom phase, the demand for such services is likely
to increase because of increased demand for services coming from segments of the
population that are becoming richer. This is captured in the figure by a shift up in
the demand curve for manual tasks. Given that demand is increasing for cognitive
tasks and decreasing for routine tasks during the boom phase, the net e↵ect on the
supply of workers to manual occupations is unclear. For this reason, we have kept
the supply curve for manual tasks in Figure 13a unchanged. Accordingly, with an
increased demand for manual work, we should expect the price of the task to rise, as
shown in the figure. The increased price would then favor movement of people from
the household sector to the manual task sector. This is depicted by the reduction in
17In this section, as in the model, we abstract from general shifts in the supply of high educated
workers.
18Note that in both markets, on the x-axis we have the number of e ciency units and on the
y-axis is the price of the task. As we emphasized earlier, it is important to bear in mind that the
price of the task is not generally equivalent to the observed wage in a sector since wage payments are
a combination of the price of the task and the number of e ciency units of the person performing
the task.
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the supply in the household sector in Figure 13b. Thus, this simple extension of the
model captures a polarization of jobs during the boom phase with employment and
the task price increasing in both the cognitive and manual sectors.
Figure 14a captures what we view as the main new insight in our paper: the idea
that the demand for cognitive tasks shifted down after 2000 (the bust period). In
our model, this happens because of the nature of adjustment of the organizational
capital stock but, as we discussed earlier, it could also happen for other reasons such
as the arrival of a new technology that is biased against (most) cognitive tasks. What
we want to emphasize is less the reason for the reversal in our model than the fact
of a reversal itself and its implications for the remainder of the labor market. Those
implications are captured, in part, in Figure 14b, which represents events in the
routine sector in the bust phase. In this sector, the technological change continues
to shift the demand curve downward while the supply curve shifts out because the
falling skill price in the cognitive sector induces workers (who are predominantly high
educated) to shift toward other sectors. The result is a clear implication in terms of
a falling routine task price and falling employment if the demand shift is stronger
than the supply shift.
In Figure 15, we graph supply and demand in the manual and home sectors during
the bust phase. With skill prices falling in both the cognitive and routine sectors,
more skilled workers move down the occupation ladder. This de-skilling process will
tend to increase the supply of workers to the manual task sector thereby putting
downward pressure on the task price in that sector. With a depressed price now in
all three task markets, this will also tend to push the least skilled individuals out of
the market altogether and into the home sector, as represented by the shift out in
the supply for labor in the home sector. The net results in the bust phase for this
extended version of the model is decreased employment in both the cognitive sectors
and the routine sector, increased employment in the manual sector, and decreased
employment rates as the least skilled leave the market. In the cognitive task sector,
we would expect to see a falling skill price along with declining employment, as fits
with a decline in demand. In comparison, in the manual sector, we expect to see
movements that fit with an outward shift in demand: more employment but lower
skill prices. This contrasts with the evidence of a positive shift in demand in this
sector in the 1990s documented by Autor and co-authors. Finally, in the routine
sector, the combination of supply and demand shifts make implications somewhat
less clear, but we expect to see a decline in the skill price and a decline in employment.
Whether driven by our specific mechanism or not, the key points are: a) that a period
of increased demand for cognitive tasks was followed by a period of declining demand;
and b) that this has generated first a drawing of workers up the occupational skill
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ladder (and into the labor market in general) and then a cascading of workers down
the skill ladder (and out of the labor market for some); and c) that together these
movements can explain the patterns in our initial figures as being driven ultimately
by the reversal in the cognitive task market. We investigate these broad patterns
empirically in the next section.
Finally, it is interesting to consider the relative sizes of the declines in the skill
prices in the three sectors during the bust phase. It is not uncommon to depict the
routine sector as an imperfectly competitive sector (perhaps because of unions) with
workers being paid above market clearing wages. In that case, the workers entering
the manual job sector in the bust phase would not be indi↵erent between manual
and routine jobs, and we would expect to see relatively larger declines in manual
occupation wages.
3 Patterns of Employment, Skill Upgrading and
Task Prices
In this section we use data from the US Current Population Survey (CPS) from
1980-2010 to document three sets of labor market patterns which we argue support
the simple boom-bust model of technological change we outlined in Section 2. We
begin by examining aggregate changes in employment across occupations, focusing
on di↵erences between the 1990s and the 2000s. Then we turn to the changes in
the distribution of workers across occupations, conditioning on worker skill. Finally,
we report wage patterns. Our goal is to explore the extent to which these data are
broadly consistent with the extended version of the model. In summary, we see the
model (including the extension incorporating the manual sector) as predicting the
following key patterns:
1. During an initial boom phase, we should observe an increase in employment in
cognitive and possibly in manual tasks, with an increase in the price of both
these tasks. We should witness a decrease in employment in routine tasks and
a likely exit out of the home sector (i.e., an increase in the overall employment
rate). This process should generally be associated with occupational up-grading
for individuals of all skill levels.
2. During the later bust phase, we should observe a decrease in the price of all
three tasks. For cognitive and routine tasks we should observe a reduction in
employment, while there would be increased employment in manual tasks and a
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flow into the home sector. Throughout this phase of the process, we should ob-
serve task down-grading for individuals in both high and low education groups.
3.1 Occupational Employment Patterns
In order to document the employment patterns of job categories captured by the
model, we group occupations into three broad categories based on the types of tasks
predominantly performed within them. The categorization follows that in Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013) and consists of: 1) cognitive, non-
routine task occupations, including managerial, professional and technical occupa-
tions; 2) routine task occupations, which include clerical and o ce jobs, sales and
production occupations; and 3) manual, non-routine task occupations, which include
laborers, transportation, farming, and household service occupations. In what fol-
lows, we refer to these three occupation groups by their respective predominant task
usage.
In Figure 16 we plot the fraction of individuals aged 18-65 employed in occupa-
tions that require substantial cognitive skills for each year from 1973 through 2011
(normalized to zero in 1999). As can be seen from the figure, this ratio increased sub-
stantially from 1980 to 2000, and then it appears to reach a plateau over the period
2000-2010. On this figure, we also report a (per capita) supply index for cognitive
occupations. This index is constructed from a counterfactual exercise. In particular,
changes in occupational employment rates could come about through changes in the
occupation structure or from composition changes. We perform a simple reweight-
ing exercise that holds the composition of educational attainment, age, and gender
constant overtime. Using these weights, we recalculate counterfactual occupational
employment rates holding constant the composition of the workforce. We interpret
the di↵erence between the observed and counterfactual employment rates as a supply
index. This supply measure will reflect changes in, for example, the availability of
college graduates for high-skill occupations.
There are two key features of Figure 16 that we wish to highlight. First, from
1980 to about 2000, employment in cognitive jobs grew faster than the supply index,
suggesting that demand for cognitive tasks outstripped supply. In contrast, after
2000, the supply index continued to grow at a similar rate as in the pre-2000 period,
but cognitive employment stalled. We interpret these trends as suggesting that
demand for cognitive jobs likely decreased over this second period since in a simple
demand and supply framework, for overall employment to stay constant in the face of
increased supply would require a shift down in demand. To make this pattern more
transparent, in Figure 17 we adjust our cognitive task employment rate series by
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subtracting the supply index from the original series, thereby creating a occupational
employment rate series adjusted for compositional changes.19 Superimposed on this
series in an estimated cubic trend. As can be seen in the figure, even after adjusting
for the change in composition of the population, the ratio of individuals in cognitive
jobs increased substantially over the 1980-2000 period. In contrast, after 2000 we
see a general fall in this ratio. While the boom period of 2003-2006 reversed the fall
for a few years, there appears to be a substantial downward trend post-2000. This
constitutes a first piece of evidence suggesting an important reversal in the demand
for cognitive tasks beginning in the year 2000.
In Figure 18 we report a series similar to Figure 17 which focuses on routine
occupations. This figure controls for changes in the composition of the population in
the same way, and overlays a cubic trend. Not surprisingly, the figure shows a fall in
the routine-jobs employment rate that starts in the late 1980s, and then gradually
accelerates with a very sharp decrease arising in 2000. This pattern has been noticed
by many in both the media and academic research (e.g., Charles, Hurst, and No-
towidigdo (2012) and Siu and Jaimovich (2012)) and is now commonly interpreted
as reflecting the replacement of such jobs by technological advances (robotics and
information technology) and o↵-shoring.
Finally, in Figure 19, we consider manual jobs and obtain a very di↵erent pat-
tern from the previous two figures: the adjusted employment rate in manual jobs
grew steadily for three decades. This growth arises despite the fact that workforce
composition changes have worked against employment in manual jobs. In partic-
ular, increases in educational attainment over this period act to reduce supply for
manual jobs since these tasks are predominately held by low-skilled workers. Hence,
19While we view these exercises as largely indicative rather than conclusive, the issue of the
potential endogeneity of educational composition shifts is a clear concern. We have attempted to
investigate the importance of this in a number of ways. First, we used state-level data on occu-
pational employment rates and educational composition in regressions of changes in occupational
employment rates on changes in the proportion in each educational category. We ran this regression
pooled across cities and include year e↵ects, implying that we were using state-specific deviations
from overall trends to identify the relationship between education shifts and occupation changes.
Using the estimated coe cients from this exercise, we formed predicted occupational employment
for the country as a whole and repeat the exercise carried out in Figure 17 using this alternative
supply measure. While this uses education coe cients that are constructed very di↵erently from
the re-weighting approach, the results are very similar to what we have presented here. There
might be concern about using such high frequency variation to identify the education e↵ects and
so we also tried using the opposite: a pure between estimator in which we used over-time averages
by state. Again, we constructed predicted supply measures using the estimated coe cients. The
patterns for the manager, professional and technical occupation group again look very similar to
what is presented here.
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the sustained growth observed in Figure 19 must reflect a demand for manual tasks
that has been strong throughout this time period or that higher-skill workers tradi-
tionally supplying their labor to other sectors are now performing manual tasks in
response to limited opportunities elsewhere. In what follows, we provide evidence
that is supportive of this latter mechanism for the post-2000 period.
Figures 17, 18, and 19 provide an overview of changes in the occupational struc-
ture of the working age population when we use a three-group classification to rep-
resent jobs. One drawback of such an approach is that such a division is that it
is artificial in the sense that occupations generally combine di↵erent types of tasks,
implying that the classification should be much more continuous. To examine the ro-
bustness of the above patterns to a more continuous classification, we adopt a version
of Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006)’s methodology in which we rank occupations by
their mean wage in 1980 then group occupations together into 100 categories that
correspond to percentiles of employment. This is intended to represent a ranking of
occupations by a measure of skill (the average wage). We then calculate the change in
the share of total hours worked in the economy for each percentile and fit a smoothed
line through these data to get a measure of employment growth for jobs at di↵erent
percentiles of the occupational skill distribution.20 Each year of data in the figure
actually represents two adjacent years that we pool together to reduce noise. Fig-
ure 20 contains the resulting smoothed employment growth changes for the periods
1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2007, 2000-2010.21
A few key patterns stand out from this figure. For the decades prior to 2000,
employment growth occurs disproportionately in occupations with base-period wages
above the median. Given that high-wage occupations tend to be more strongly
associated with cognitive tasks and with higher skills, this pattern fits well with
theories of skill-biased demand shifts. It is also noteworthy that the changes become
non-monotonic in the 1990s, with occupations in the bottom decile of the wage
distribution growing relative to those between about the 20th and 40th percentiles.
This is the source of Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006)’s argument that technological
change became polarizing in the 1990s in the US.
What is perhaps most striking, though, is the change in the shape of the curve
after 2000. The relative growth of the lowest percentile occupations becomes very
20A key challenge in constructing these figures is to obtain consistent occupational categories
across time. In Appendix A, we provide the details on how we constructed those categories and on
robustness check exercises.
21Since this figure relates to the share of hours worked in the economy, it is unclear whether
the plotted changes correspond to net increases or decreases in employment. In the appendix we
therefore report a similar figure calculated for changes in employment rates instead of employment
shares.
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strong after 2000. This is a point emphasized by (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) in a
figure that is extremely similar to the one presented here. But just as striking is the
evaporation of relative growth in the top percentiles. Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
note this change in passing but do not emphasize it. We, in contrast, believe this
change could be key to understanding the overall shifts emphasized in Section 1.
Since part of the changes in Figure 20 could reflect simple changes in the compo-
sition of the working age population, we construct a counterfactual version of Figure
20 in which we hold population composition constant. Our approach is a re-weighting
approach similar in spirit to DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), where we form
weighted employment totals in each occupation in each year. The weights are con-
structed so that the re-weighted educational, age, and gender composition in each
year remains constant. Specifically, each person’s employment outcome is weighted
by the ratio of the proportion of people in their education-age-gender category in
1989 to the proportion of people in their category in the survey year. This exer-
cise is intended to e↵ectively un-do occupation specific supply shifts generated from
changes in the education composition of the workforce.
Figure 21 contains the plotted employment share change lines using the re-
weighted data. The result is an even more strongly U-shaped profile in the 1990s
but – and especially relevant for our interpretation of the data – also a decrease in
employment share in the 2000s for the occupations at the high end of the wage dis-
tribution. We interpret this pattern as a decline in demand for high-wage, cognitive
occupations during this decade that was partly masked by an increase in supply of
skills to these occupations due to composition changes – particularly the ongoing
increases in the educational attainment of the workforce. In both Figures 20 and
21, we report changes for the period 2000-2007 and 2000-2010 in order to clarify the
role of the financial crisis, and subsequent adjustments, on the patterns we are em-
phasizing. As can be seen from either figure, the post-2000 shifts in the occupation
structure are not driven by the post-financial crisis period as the data give a similar
picture when examining the 2000-2007 or 2000-2010 periods.
In the appendix, we present a double di↵erence taken based on Figure 20, where
we plot the di↵erences between the 1980s versus the 1990s and the 1990s versus
the 2000s. This serves to highlight that the earlier period from the 1980s to the
1990s was characterized by an acceleration of employment concentration at the top
and bottom of the occupational wage distribution. In contrast, for the 2000s versus
the 1990s, the major change is a reversal in the employment growth pattern for the
high-wage occupations. Thus, it emphasizes what is evident in Figure 20: that there
was a ‘great reversal’ in the demand for cognitive tasks. Later, in the section on
task prices, we argue that the wage patterns are supportive of the notion of such a
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reversal.
3.2 Skill Upgrading and Downgrading
The previous section contrasts the strong growth in cognitive employment prior to
2000 with its subsequent reversal. This pattern pertains to the entire working-age
population and is especially striking when controlling for composition shifts in the
workforce. In this section, we highlight the response of di↵erent education groups
to the shift in the demand for cognitive skills. According to the model, workers
will respond to an increase in the demand for cognitive skills by moving into these
occupations and to a decline in cognitive demand by exiting into alternative sectors.
It is these implications we seek to investigate in this section, with the turning point
in demand set as 2000.
Figures 22 and 23 examine the task assignment of workers with four years of
college education (BAs) using two di↵erent measures of task assignment. In Figure
22, we plot an index of the average cognitive task intensity of college graduates over
the 1980-2010 period. The index is normalized to equal one in 1990 and movements
in the index can be interpreted as changes in average cognitive task usage relative
to that year. We measure cognitive intensity by assigning to each 4 digit occupation
an average of their scores for cognitive tasks from the Dictionary of Occupation
Titles (DOT). We define cognitive tasks as the non-routine analytic and interactive
tasks used in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) in their examination of the skill
content of jobs.22 Movements in this cognitive task intensity index reflect movements
in college educated workers across occupations. The figure indicates that average
cognitive task intensity for college graduates increased from the early 1980s until
about the year 2000 and then declined throughout the rest of the series. Figure 23
provides additional evidence of this trend by plotting the ratio of college employment
in cognitive (i.e., managerial, professional and technical) jobs to non-cognitive jobs.
Similar to the previous figure, the cognitive to non-cognitive employment ratio of
college workers increases from the early 1980s until the year 2000. In the 2000s,
college workers shifted employment away from cognitive occupations and toward
routine and manual occupations.
To further examine the changing patterns of employment among education groups,
we construct indices that capture routine and manual task intensities. Our measure
22In particular, we measure cognitive tasks by the average of the code math and dcp provided by
David Autor (available on his webpage), which measure ‘general educational development: math’
and ‘accepting the responsibility for the direction, control or planning of an activity.’ Precise
definitions can be found in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).
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for routine task intensity is constructed by averaging Autor, Levy, and Murnane
(2003)’s measure for routine-cognitive and routine-manual tasks.23 Figure 24 plots
an index for routine task intensity for both college and high school graduates. As
can be seen, the value of this index declines for both education groups throughout
the late-1980s and the 1990s, before showing an upward trend for college workers
in the 2000s. Following from the model, we interpret the turnaround in the trend
for the college educated workers as stemming from them “cascading” down from the
cognitive occupations, where demand is falling. For the high school educated work-
ers, after 2000 we see a continued decline in the performance of routine tasks. We
interpret this as resulting from the general decline in demand in routine tasks and,
after 2000, from more educated workers pushing high school educated workers out
of these occupations. It is important to note that there was a substantial change in
the occupation coding in the CPS in 2003. This may account for the sharp jump
in the proportion of BAs in routine jobs in that year. However, the trend toward
the routine sector for the BAs continues to be evident even if we focus only on the
post-2003 period where the occupational coding is consistent.
In Figure 25 we present an index of manual task intensity for both college and
high school graduates.24 For high school educated workers, the value of this index
rises throughout the time period. In the 1990s, this could reflect the type of increase
in demand for these occupations stressed in Autor’s work while in our model the
increase in the 2000s would reflect a supply shift. For college educated workers, the
manual index displays somewhat of a U-shape – declining in the 1980s to the mid-
1990s, before trending upward to the end of the series. The reversal in the college
series is quite dramatic – college workers become more manual task intensive in the
2000s than at any earlier period in our time frame. 25 This pattern is consistent with
the forces emphasized in the model whereby the reduction in the demand for both
cognitive and routine tasks in the post-2000 period lead workers from both education
groups to supply more work to manual tasks.26
To obtain a more detailed view of the occupational shifting by di↵erent education
groups, Figures 26 and 27 examine changes in employment for young college and high
23In particular, we take the average of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003)’s variables sts and
finger, which measure ‘set standards and tolerances’ (routine-cognitive) and ‘finger dexterity’
(routine-manual), respectively.
24The measure for manual task comes form Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003)’s variable ehf,
which measures ‘eye-hand-foot’ coordination.
25Again, the 2003 coding shift may be partly responsible for the strong upward pattern but the
increase in the manual task index for BAs is evident both before and after 2003.
26In the appendix, Figure 36, provides a plot of the cognitive content of jobs held by high school
educated workers.
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school graduates by comparing their employment densities before and after 2000 for
occupations ranked by their average wage in 1980. Occupational densities (or em-
ployment rates) are constructed by calculating the probability that an individual
in a given education-demographic group is observed in each occupation (including
unemployment). Taking the di↵erence in occupational densities over time, when the
occupations are ranked by their average wage in 1980, indicates whether a given ed-
ucation group has shifted employment systematically in terms of occupations ranked
by wage. In figure 26, we plot these changes for college workers between the ages of
25-35, and fit a line using a local-mean smoother to highlight the pattern. In the first
panel, which shows the results for the 1990s, the upward slope of the smoothed line
indicates that employment of college graduates shifted towards high-skill, high-pay
occupations. The second panel documents that this situation completely reverses
for the 2000s: college workers move out of high-wage occupations toward lower-
paying ones.27 We interpret this shift in occupational employment as young college
graduates responding to the decline in the demand for cognitive tasks by accepting
alternative task assignments. Figure 27 shows that, beginning in the 1990s, high
school educated workers were already shifting away from middle-paying occupations
towards low-paying ones and that this trend was amplified during the 2000s.
Together, we view the set of Figures from 22 to 27 as providing a consistent
picture of shifts in occupational employment for college and high school graduates. In
particular, these figures document that over the 1990s there was a shift in employment
that is characterized by skill-upgrading of college workers. In the post-2000 period,
however, the shifts in employment for both groups of workers can be characterized
as one of skill-downgrading, with those shifts having started well before the 2007
financial crisis.
3.3 Task prices
In this subsection, our aim is to provide a picture of the over-time changes in the
shadow prices of the three tasks emphasized in the model: cognitive, routine and
manual. The behaviour of task prices is key to understanding whether the employ-
ment patterns we document are driven by shifts in supply or demand. The narrative
that we advance suggests that the decrease in cognitive tasks in the post-2000 period
is due to a reduction in demand. If this is the case, we should observe an accompa-
nying decrease in the price of cognitive tasks. On the other hand, we also observe
27Appendix Figure 37 shows that the results are similar whether we look over the 2000-2007 or
the 2000-2010 period, indicating that this shifting pattern is not the result of the financial crisis
but part of an ongoing post-2000 trend.
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a shift in employment toward jobs utilizing manual tasks. Our interpretation of the
data suggests that this shift is mainly driven by a supply channel; that is, we argue
that this shift is the result of high-skilled individuals taking lower skilled jobs due to
the decline in demand for both routine and cognitive tasks. As such, this outward
shift in supply should place downward pressure on the price of manual tasks.
The di culty we face in examining these issues is that task prices are not readily
observable. We observe the wage paid to workers in di↵erent occupations, but, as
the model suggests, these wages will not in general reflect the task price. The reason
is that the wage paid to an individual employed in a given occupation will reflect the
the number of e↵ective units of skill embodied in the individual multiplied by the
skill price. As task prices change, so too will the composition of individuals across
occupations. The selection mechanism, as parametrized in the model, implies that
changes in the price of the cognitive task would not be reflected in changes in the
average wage in cognitive jobs. While we do not take this parametrization seriously,
we do believe that selection is relevant over this period, and this makes inferences
about task prices from observed wage movements di cult.
To illustrate the potential importance of selection of individuals across occupa-
tions over time, in Figure 28 to 30 we plot two alternative measures of the average
wage paid in cognitive, routine and manual jobs. The first measure, represented by
the dark line in each of the figures, corresponds to the simple, observed average wage
paid in each occupation. The second measure, represented by the dashed line in each
figure, calculates the average wage in each occupation while holding the composition
of education, age and gender constant at their 1980 levels. When focusing on the
2000-2010 period, the average wage for each of the three occupation groups increases
substantially. From this perspective, it would not appear that the prices for any of
these tasks had declined. However, when we control for changes in the observable
characteristics of the individuals in each of these occupations, we get a very di↵erent
picture. Composition adjusted changes in real wages over the period are close to zero
for each group. For example, the real wage growth over 2000-2010 for wages in cog-
nitive occupations is 6% in the raw data and about 2% when adjusted for observable.
Similarly, for manual tasks the growth in real wages is close to 6% in the raw data
and close to 1% in the adjusted data over the same period. Since this correction only
accounts for changes in observables, it likely underestimates the e↵ects of selection
on the wage series as it is quite plausible that changes in unobserved heterogeneity
mimicked changes in observed heterogeneity.
We examine the relevance of selection on unobserved heterogeneity in Figure 31,
where we plot the changes in real wages of young college educated workers at each
percentile of the wage distribution. In constructing this figure, we calculate each
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percentile of the wage distribution in each year. In doing so, we impute the wages
of non-workers as zero, which accounts for about a 5th of the sample for each year
on average. The series in the figure represent the di↵erences in log wages at each
percentile of non-zero wages for the indicated time periods.28 To relate these changes
to task prices (which is our ultimate goal), requires an assumption of a ‘single-index’
model of wage generation. Given this, if the distribution of the unobserved skill
is relatively constant over time then we can interpret changes in wages at a given
percentile as representing the change in the wage for a worker with a given skill
level defined by a combination of observed and unobserved skills.29 If, in addition,
the workers at a given percentile are predominantly in one occupation then we can
go further and interpret the wage change at that percentile as corresponding to
the change in the task price (the amount paid per unit skill) in that occupation. We
recognize that the assumptions underlying this exercise are strong but, in the absence
of true panel data, we still view them as reasonable (though crude) approximations
to the skill prices that are our main point of interest.
As can be seen from the figure, over the 1990-2000 period wages increased substan-
tially for young college workers in the top quarter of the wage distribution. Since
cognitive jobs are heavily represented in this part of the wage distribution (with
approximately 80% of young BA workers with wages between the 80th and 100th
percentiles being in cogntive occupations), we interpret this increase as reflecting
an increase in the price of cognitive tasks during this time. When we turn to the
post-2000 time period, a di↵erent picture emerges: real wages decrease throughout
the distribution for young college workers. Notably, this includes wages at the top of
the distribution, which, again, mainly correspond to employment in cognitive jobs,
implying that the price of cognitive tasks has likely fallen over this period.30
Figure 32 constructs a similar figure for young high school graduates. As is clear
from the figure, the proportion of this group not working is much larger and this
results in the change in wage percentile series beginning to take non-zero values
28For percentiles at which individuals are non-employed in one year but employed and with an
observed wage in another year, we plot the di↵erence as a zero.
29Note that it is important to include the non-workers in this exercise because the 90th percentile
of the wage distribution conditional on working will shift as the employment rate shifts, implying
that it would correspond to workers with di↵erent underlying skill index values.
30Recall that, in our model, the entrepreneur group will benefit throughout. Some of these
individuals may be in our sample which would tend to bias upwards the real wage movements and
thereby could mask any fall in the price of cognitive tasks to some extent. For older (over age 35)
BAs, where we believe this problem is likely more prevalent (in addition to potential biased due to
more long term implicit contracts), we do not observe declines in real wages at the very top of the
wage distribution. This is reported in Figure 39 of the appendix.
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at much higher percentiles than for the college group. Focusing on the 1990-2000
period, the pattern of wage changes is ‘J’ shaped, with increases at the bottom of
the wage distribution while being stagnant or declining at the top. For young high
school workers, those with wages between about the 80th and 90th percentiles are
predominantly (over 60%) in routine jobs. Focusing on this part of the distribution
indicates a slight fall in real wages, which we interpret as a fall in the routine task
price in this period. At the other end, young high school workers below about the
45th percentile in this figure are largely (close to 60%) in manual occupations. In that
range, there is an increase in wages in the 1990s, which we interpret as a rise in the
manual task price. Taking Figures 31 and 32 together, the patterns we document are
consistent with those emphasized by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) who view the
1990s as a period of wage ‘polarization’ brought about by changes in task demands.
Turing to the 2000s, the figure indicates that young high school workers experienced
a fall in wages at all percentiles. The decline in the region we have identified with
routine tasks is about the same size as in the 1990s but the pattern near the 40th
percentile, which we associate with the manual task price, is strongly downward.
The sharp fall in wages at the bottom fits with our narrative that the increase in
employment in manual jobs reflects supply factors rather than demand factors for
the post-2000 period.
To bring together these implications in a more readable manner, in Figure 33, we
plot our measures of the task prices for the three occupations for each year in our
sample. More specifically, the cognitive task price corresponds to the average of the
log wages between the 80th and 90th percentiles of the distribution (including the
non-employed) for young BAs. The routine task price corresponds to the average of
the log wage between the 80th and 90th percentiles for young high school individuals,
and the manual task price is the average between the 37th and 40th percentiles for
the young high school individuals. We normalize all three series to their 1990 values.
From this one can see that the early 90s recession was associated with declines in all
three task prices, o↵set to some degree by gains in the strong labor market of the
second half of the 90s. For cognitive tasks, the gains were strong enough that the
task price was above its 1990 price by the early 2000s, and the same is true to a lesser
extent for manual tasks. In contrast, the routine task price does not recover its 1990
level. Again, this fits with the standard story of polarization in the 1990s. But all
three task prices fall in the 2000s and, notably, are declining well before the onset of
the late 2000s recession. Our measure of the cognitive task price falls by about 2%
in real terms, fitting with our story of declining demand for these tasks. This decline
is dwarfed by the 8% decline in the price of manual tasks. The latter drop fits with
our claim that the manual task market in the 2000s can be characterized as being
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dominated by an outward supply shift.31
To complete the wage picture, in Figure 34 we report changes in real wage by
deciles for young workers when we do not divide by education level. This has both
advantages and disadvantages relative to the earlier figures controlling for education.
On the one hand, if there has been sorting of individuals between education groups
over the period in question, the distribution of unobservable skill within an educa-
tion group may change, and comparing percentiles while conditioning on education
is less clean as a measure of task prices. On the other hand, increases in educational
attainment over time may change the quality at a given percentile. Hence, we choose
to present results with and without conditioning on education. When we do not con-
dition on education, as in Figure 34, the 1990s show a clear ‘U’ shaped wage growth
pattern that has been documented elsewhere (see, for example, Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2008) and Lemieux (2008)) and has become known as ‘wage polarization.’
The 2000s, on the other hand, show a fall in real wages at all percentiles with the
greatest declines at the low end of the wage distribution.
3.3.1 Cross-City Evidence
We next look for corroborating evidence for the model by using very di↵erent data
variation from what we have used to this point: cross-city variation. In particular,
we treat each city as a separate economy with di↵erential abilities to take advantage
of the new technology. In the context of the model, this corresponds to assuming
that local economies can di↵er in their change in  , the technology improvement.
Di↵erences in the capacity of cites to take advantage of new technological oppor-
tunities could arise from di↵erence in local culture or local advantages, but we will
remain agnostic about the specific reason for these capacity di↵erences.
Given these di↵erences across local economies, cities with a greater change in  
(i.e., cities better situated to take advantage of the technological shift) should have
seen a greater boom in the 1980 and 1990s, especially in terms of increased hiring in
managerial and professional occupations. However, such cities should also experience
31The post-2000 pattern of declines does not perfectly fit with our Roy type model of supply. In
particular, for workers to be choosing to move to lower occupations as the model implies, we should
see the decline in task prices being largest for the high end occupations and smallest for the low
end, service occupations. One could view the relative movements in the cognitive and routine task
prices as potentially in line with this since they both move down to similar degrees and there surely
is considerable measurement error in our task price measures. But the much larger decline in the
manual task price is hard to reconcile with this feature of the model. As discussed earlier, such a
pattern might arise if the routine occupations face downward wage rigidities arising, for example,
because of unions.
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a greater bust post-2000. To explore this implication – which suggests that the post-
2000 decline reflects an ongoing adjustment to the earlier boom – we examine the
extent to which the post-2000 bust is associated with measures of the pre-2000 boom.
In particular, our measure of the bust is the change in the employment rate. We
begin by focusing on changes in the aggregate employment rate, but we also provide
evidence broken down by education groups.
Given our assumption that adoption of the new technology requires manage-
rial workers, higher adoption cities should be cities with more substantial increases
in managers both as a proportion of the population of the city and as a share of
employment in the city in the 1990s. The higher-adoption cities should also see a
specific set of patterns in the 2000s that can be explored using a common regression
framework as follows:
 ERc,2010 2000 = ↵0 + ↵1Xc,pre 2000 + ✏ct, (8)
where  ERc,2010 2000 is the change in the employment rate in city c post-2000,
Xc,pre 2000 is an indicator of the boom in the pre-2000 period, and ✏ct is an error
term. In addition, ↵0 is a constant, which allows for a common trend for all cities.
Our main focus is on the sign of ↵1, which should be negative if our boom-bust
interpretation is valid. In particular, we consider several indicators of the boom: the
change in the employment rate of managers, either over the 1980-2000 period or over
the 1990-2000 period; the growth in managerial employment over these two periods;
and the simple change in the employment rate over 1980-2000 and 1990-2000.
Table 2 presents the results of OLS estimates of equation (8). The data we use in
all of our city-level cross section estimations comes from the U.S. Census and ACS
data from 1980-2010. The dependent variable in all estimates contained in Table 2
is the change in employment rate for both men and women from 2010-2000. Each
column contains the estimate of ↵1 obtained using a specific measure ofXc,pre 2000. In
particular, in columns 1 and 2, the regressors are the change in the employment rate
of Managers, Professionals, and Technicians for the 1990s and for the whole 1980-
2000 period, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 contain the estimates when we use the
growth rates of those same employment rates, and columns 5 and 6 report estimates
using the change in the overall city employment rate. In all the columns, estimates
of the ↵1 coe cient are negative and statistically significant. While these results are
just simple associations, they are supportive of the boom-bust interpretation of the
model.
31
3.4 How important could the reversal in cognitive skill de-
mand be in explaining the current low rate of employ-
ment?
In this subsection, we wish to quantify the importance of the forces we have identified
(the reversal in demand for cognitive tasks and the cascading down of supply after
2000) for understanding current low rates of employment in the US. The precise
counterfactual to consider in this exercise is not easy to discern. We address this
issue by asking an extremely simple question: How much higher would employment
after 2000 have been if:
1. The growth in demand for cognitive tasks had been as great as in the pre-2000
period,
2. All workers displaced from cognitive occupations directly push out workers in
other sectors, one for one
3. The greater increase in the demand for cognitive jobs that would have occurred
if the pre-2000 trend had continued would not have increased or decreased the
demand for routine or manual tasks.
Under this extreme scenario, which we view as a clear upper bound on the potential
e↵ects of the the reversal of cognitive demand, we can simply use Figure 16 and
project the trend growth in the pre-2000 period in cognitive employment to the
post-2000 period and take the di↵erence relative to the actual outcome.32 Doing this
simple calculation we find that the employment rate would be about 5% higher today.
While we do not claim that this counterfactual is very meaningful, we do believe that
it highlights (as an upper bound) the potential quantitative importance of the reversal
in skill demand in adding to our understanding of the fall in employment rates since
2000.
4 Conclusion
As we noted at the outset, a substantial disagreement exists about the causes behind
the current low rate of employment in the US. Cyclical e↵ects of the 2008 financial
32Since the trend growth in supply for cognitive jobs is rather similar across the pre and post
2000 period, using either Figure 4 or 5 to do this exercise gives a similar answer. In the calculation
presented here we use Figure 4 as the estimation of a trend is easier.
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crisis likely play a role, and the structural decline in employment in routine occupa-
tions and manufacturing jobs are certainly contributing factors (Charles, Hurst, and
Notowidigdo, 2012; Siu and Jaimovich, 2012). In this paper, we present theory and
evidence suggesting that to understand the current low rates of employment in the
US one needs to recognize the large reversal in the demand for skill and cognitive
tasks that took place around the year 2000. In particular, we have argued that after
two decades of growth in the demand for occupations high in cognitive tasks, the
US economy reversed and experienced a decline in the demand for such skills. The
demand for cognitive tasks was to a large extent the motor of the US labor market
prior to 2000. Once this motor reversed, the employment rate in the US economy
started to contract. As we have emphasized, while this demand for cognitive tasks
directly e↵ects mainly high skilled workers, we have provided evidence that it has
indirectly a↵ected lower skill workers by pushing them out of jobs that have been
taken up by higher skilled worker displaced from cognitive occupations. This has
resulted in high growth in employment in low skilled manual jobs with declining
wages in those occupations, and has pushed many low skill individual;s out of the
labor market.
To help organize our thoughts about this process, we presented a simple model
where both the pre-2000 boom and post-2000 bust in demand for cognitive tasks
could be interpreted as the result of one underlying force in the form of the di↵usion
of skilled-biased technological change. The only di↵erence with more conventional
models of skill-biased technological change is our modelling of the fruits of cognitive
employment as creating a stock instead of a pure flow. This slight change causes tech-
nological change to generate a boom and bust cycle as is common in most investment
models. We also incorporated into this model a standard selection process whereby
individuals sort into occupations based on their comparative advantage. The selec-
tion process is the key mechanism that explains why a reduction in the demand for
cognitive tasks, which are predominantly filled by higher educated workers, can re-
sult in a loss of employment concentrated among lower educated workers. While we
do not claim that our model is the only structure that can explain the observations
we present, we believe it gives a very simple and intuitive explanation to the changes
pre- and post-2000.
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notes: The figure uses ORG data from 1980 to 2011. The employment rate is calculated by
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allocated wages.
36
Figure 2:
199019911992 1993
1995
1996
1997
1998
19992000
2001
2002
20032004
2005 20067
2008
2009
2010
2011
2.
5
2.
55
2.
6
2.
65
2.
7
Ho
ur
ly 
W
ag
e
.7 .72 .74 .76
Employment Rate
Real Hourly Wage vs Employment: All 
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notes: The figure uses ORG data from 1980 to 2011. The employment rate is calculated by
summing the number of respondents employed during the survey week over the total population
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summing the number of respondents employed during the survey week over the total population
aged 17-64 with positive potential work experience. Mean hourly log wages calculations exclude
allocated wages.
39
Figure 5:
.8
2
.8
4
.8
6
.8
8
Em
plo
ym
en
t R
at
io 
(H
S/
BA
)
1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Employment Ratio
High School vs College Graduates: Men and Women
notes: The figure uses ORG data from 1980 to 2011. Employment rates are calculated for
workers with exactly 16 or 12 years of education between the ages of 25-65.
40
Figure 6:
5
6
7
8
9
10
Eq
uip
m
en
t a
nd
 S
of
tw
ar
e
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Quarter
Investment as a share of GDP
41
Figure 7:
0
1
2
3
4
5
In
fo
rm
at
ion
 P
ro
ce
ss
ing
 E
qu
ipm
en
t a
nd
 S
of
tw
ar
e
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Quarter
Investment as a share of GDP
42
Figure 8:
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Co
m
pu
te
rs
 a
nd
 P
er
iph
er
al 
Eq
uip
m
en
t
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Quarter
Investment as a share of GDP
43
Figure 9:
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
So
ftw
ar
e
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Quarter
Investment as a share of GDP
44
Figure 10:
 = 0
Lc = 0
Lc = 0
.
.
.

Lc
0
1
0
Lc0 Initial SS
t=1
End SS
1
Lc1
Dynamics of Employment in Cognitive Sector
45
Figure 11:
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notes: This figure plots the response of an economy to a shock in ✓, the technology parameter. In
particular, the plot shows an economy in steady state at time t = 0 and learns at t = 1 of an
improvement in ✓ at t = 10. The details of the parametrization can be found in the text.
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notes: The figure uses ORG data from 1980 to 2011. The employment rate in the figure is
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is constructed as described in text. Both measures are normalized to 0 in 1999.
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notes: The data in the figure comes from CPS ORG from 1980-2011. The figure plots the
employment rate in Cognitive jobs after adjusting for composition shifts, as described in the text,
and a fitted cubic trend.
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Figure 18:
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notes: The data in the figure comes from CPS ORG from 1980-2011. The figure plots the
employment rate in Routine jobs after adjusting for composition shifts, as described in the text,
and a fitted cubic trend.
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Figure 19:
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notes: The data in the figure comes from CPS ORG from 1980-2011. The figure plots the
employment rate in Manual jobs after adjusting for composition shifts, as described in the text,
and a fitted cubic trend.
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Smoothed Changes in Employment by Occupation 1980−2010
notes: The figure plots the log changes in employment shares by 1980 occupational log wage
percentile rank using a locally weighted smoothing regression (STATA’s lowess smoother with
bandwidth 0.8 with 100 observations). Employment shares refer to shares of hours worked in the
economy. Occupation codes used in the figure are based on the 1980 CPS occupational coding
scheme made consistent across occupational code breaks in 1983 and 2003 using the cross-walks
weights provided by BLS. Further details are provided in the data appendix.
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Figure 21:
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Smoothed Changes in Employment by Occupation 1980−2010
notes: The figure plots the log changes in reweighted employment shares by 1980 occupational
log wage percentile rank using a locally weighted smoothing regression (STATA’s lowess
smoother with bandwidth 0.8 with 100 observations). The reweighted employment shares are
calculated by holding the demographic characteristics of the population constant as described in
text. Employment shares refer to shares of hours worked in the economy. Occupation codes used
in the figure are based on the 1980 CPS occupational coding scheme made consistent across
occupational code breaks in 1983 and 2003 using the cross-walks weights provided by BLS.
Further details are provided in the data appendix.
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Figure 22:
.9
9
1
1.
01
1.
02
1.
03
Av
er
ag
e 
Ta
sk
 C
on
te
nt
: C
og
nit
ive
1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Average Cognitive Task: College Graduates
notes: The figure plots an index (normalized to one in 1990) of average level of cognitive task for
employed college graduates over time using the CPS ORG data from 1980-2011. The cognitive
task measure comes from the average of the variables math and dcp described in Autor, Levy, and
Murnane (2003) and in the data appendix.
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College Workers
notes: The figure plots the ratio of employment in cognitive jobs vs non-cognitive jobs for college
graduates over time using the CPS ORG data from 1980-2011.
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Figure 24:
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Average Routine Task
notes: The figure plots an index (normalized to one in 1990) of the average level of routine task
for employed high school and college graduates over time using the CPS ORG data from
1980-2011. The routine task measure comes from the average of the variables figure and sts
described in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and in the data appendix.
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Figure 25:
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Average Manual Task
notes: The figure plots an index (normalized to one in 1990) of the average level of manual task
for employed high school and college graduates over time using the CPS ORG data from
1980-2011. The manual task measure comes from the variable ehf described in Autor, Levy, and
Murnane (2003) and in the data appendix.
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Figure 26:
−.
01
0
.0
1
.0
2
Ch
an
ge
 in
 E
m
plo
ym
en
t R
at
e
2 2.5 3 3.5
occupation wage: 1980
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .19, pwidth = .29
2000−1990
−.
01
0
.0
1
.0
2
Ch
an
ge
 in
 E
m
plo
ym
en
t R
at
e
2 2.5 3 3.5
occupation wage: 1980
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .11, pwidth = .16
2010−2000
Occupational Employment Rates:  Young BAs   
 
 CI  Smoothed Change 
 Employment Rate Change 
notes: The figure plots the change in employment rate for young college workers over the
1990-2000 and the 2000-2010 period by occupation against the occupation 1980 log wage. The
solid line represents an estimated local-mean smooth of the employment rate changes.
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Figure 27:
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notes: The figure plots the change in employment rate for young high school graduates over the
1990-2000 and the 2000-2010 period by occupation against the occupation 1980 log wage. The
solid line represents an estimated local-mean smooth of the employment rate changes.
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Figure 28:
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notes: The figure plots the average log wage by indicated occupation group by taking a raw
average and an average using fixed weights, where the weights hold the demographic composition
constant within an occupation over time.
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Figure 29:
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notes: The figure plots the average log wage by indicated occupation group by taking a raw
average and an average using fixed weights, where the weights hold the demographic composition
constant within an occupation over time.
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Figure 30:
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notes: The figure plots the average log wage by indicated occupation group by taking a raw
average and an average using fixed weights, where the weights hold the demographic composition
constant within an occupation over time.
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Figure 31:
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Change in Wage percentiles: group Young BA
notes: The figure plots the change in log wage at each percentile in the wage distribution for
three di↵erent time periods. When calculating the wage percentile, we include both allocated and
non-allocated wages and do not remove outliers. For non-workers, we impute log wage as zero.
The series are plotted starting at the first non-zero wage percentile.
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Figure 32:
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notes: The figure plots the change in log wage at each percentile in the wage distribution for
three di↵erent time periods. When calculating the wage percentile, we include both allocated and
non-allocated wages and do not remove outliers. For non-workers, we impute log wage as zero.
The series are plotted starting at the first non-zero wage percentile.
67
Figure 33:
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Task prices: 1990−2010
notes: The figure plots the task-price indices for manual, routine and cogntive tasks over time.
The construction of the price indices is described in the text.
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notes: The figure plots the change in log wage at each percentile in the wage distribution for
three di↵erent time periods. When calculating the wage percentile, we include both allocated and
non-allocated wages and do not remove outliers. For non-workers, we impute log wage as zero.
The series are plotted starting at the first non-zero wage percentile.
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Table 2: Estimates of Equation (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 2000 1990M ratec -0.48
⇤
(0.13)
 2000 1980M ratec -0.26
⇤
(0.087)
 2000 1990 logM ratec -0.15
⇤
(0.037)
 2000 1980 logM ratec -0.12
⇤
(0.023)
 2000 1990ERc -0.32⇤
(0.10)
 2000 1980ERc -0.39⇤
(0.055)
Constant -0.017⇤ -0.011 -0.015⇤ 0.0084 -0.034⇤ -0.016⇤
(0.0053) (0.0079) (0.0054) (0.0088) (0.0020) (0.0033)
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231
R2 0.071 0.060 0.089 0.13 0.069 0.24
Notes: U.S. Census and ACS data from 1980-2010. Unit of observation is the CMSA. All
regressions are weighted by the square root of the city size in 1980. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. (⇤) denotes significance at the 5% level.
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A Data
A.1 May/ORG Current Population Survey
May CPS data from 1973-1978 and ORG CPS data from 1979-2011 are downloaded from the
NBER33
– Initial extractions included all individuals between the ages of 16-64.
– Potential experience calculated as:
max (min (age  years of school  6, age  16, 0))
– Sample further restricted to those with positive potential experience.
– Prior to 1992, education was reported as the number of completed years. In 1992 and after,
education is reported in categories as the highest grade/degree completed.
1. We convert categories to years of completed school in the post-1991 data based on Park
(1994)
2. We convert years into categories in the pre-1992 data based on Jaeger and Page (1996)
(code provided by NBER).
A.1.1 Wage data
The construction of our wage data closely follows Lemieux (2006).
– Wage data is based on those who report employment in reference week.
– In all wage calculations, we set allocated wages to missing.
– Our hourly wage measure is based on reported hourly wage for those who report hourly
payment and not adjusted for topcoding. For workers who are not paid hourly:
1. We use edited weekly earnings. For the years 1984-1986, we use unedited earnings due
to the higher topcode value.
2. Adjust topcoded wages by a factor of 1.4.
3. Divide the result by usual hours worked per week.
– For all wage data, we set to missing hourly wages below 1 and greater than 100 in 1979
dollars based on the CPI.34
– For all reported wage statistics, we construct a ‘labor supply weight’ by multiplying the usual
weight in the May CPS and the earnings weight in the ORG CPS by usual hours divided by
35.
– We use these ‘labor supply weights’ when we construct occupational employment shares.
33Links are http://www.nber.org/data/cps may.html and http://www.nber.org/data/morg.html
34CPI data from http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu and includes all items.
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A.2 Investment Data
The investment data we use was downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Data
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) on 2013-05-23. The series we use to construct our figures
are:
1. Private fixed investment: Nonresidential: Information processing equipment and software
(A679RC1Q027SBEA), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
2. Private fixed investment: Nonresidential: Information processing equipment and software:
Computers and peripheral equipment (B935RC1Q027SBEA), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly,
Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
3. Private fixed investment: Nonresidential: Information processing equipment and software:
Software (B985RC1Q027SBEA), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual
Rate
4. Private fixed investment: Nonresidential: Information processing equipment and software:
Computers and peripheral equipment (B935RC1Q027SBEA), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly,
Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
5. Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal (GDP), Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Ad-
justed Annual Rate
B Reweighting
Our reweighting procedure is based on DiNardo et. al. (1996). We chose a base year of 1989. We
pool the base year with each year in our May/ORG data and construct a variable equal to one if an
individual is observed in 1989. With this as the dependent variable, we run a logit regression. The
right hand side variables include education (six categories), age (in two-year bins), and indicators
for gender and non-white ethnicity. Education and gender are interacted with every variable.
We use the predicted values or propensity scores from these estimations to form counterfactual
weights that hold the composition of the workforce constant over time. Our procedure closely
follows Lemieux (2006).
C Occupation Categories
– The occupation categories we use are based on the 1980/90 Census occupation categories.
Several small changes where made in the 1990 Census occupation classifications that required
slight aggregation. We use the code provide by http://www.unionstats.com to make these
adjustments.
– The categories are consistent from 1983-2002.
– For years prior to 1983 and after 2002, we use BLS crosswalks35 to allocated workers to the
1980/90 categories.
35Obtained from http://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/occ ind.shtml
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– Our broad occupation categories are made after converting all data to the 80/90 categories
and aggregating up.
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D Additional Figures: Temp section header for
appendix tables
Figure 35:
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Figure 36:
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Average Cognitive Task: High School Graduates
notes: The figure plots the average level of cognitive task and cognitive/non-cognitive
employment ratio for high school graduates over time using the CPS ORG data from 1980-2011.
The cognitive task measure comes from the average of the variables math and dcp described in
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and in the data appendix.
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Figure 37:
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notes: The figure plots the average level of cognitive task for employed college graduates over
time using the CPS ORG data from 1980-2011. The cognitive task measure comes from the
average of the variables math and dcp described in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and in the
data appendix.
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Figure 38:
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Figure 39:
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notes: The figure plots the change in log wage at each percentile in the wage distribution for
three di↵erent time periods. When calculating the wage percentile, we include both allocated and
non-allocated wages and do not remove outliers. For non-workers, we impute log wage as zero.
The series are plotted starting at the first non-zero wage percentile.
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